Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The recently released report containing the key results of the National Sample Survey (NSS) 1 Kannan and Raveendran (2012) adjusted the NSS to account for the underestimation of the population and estimate that the rural female labor force declined by 38.83 million. We have refrained from using populationadjusted estimates for this paper since we believe that our results still hold. As Mazumdar and Neetha (2011: 118) argue, "the need to understand the gender dimensions of employment trends in India has acquired a new urgency." The question we hence aim to address with this paper is as follows: What are the potential explanations for this decline in the women's LFPR in rural areas? We try to answer this question by exploring the NSS 61 st and 66 th round EUS data. It has to be borne in mind that in order to derive more conclusive findings, a longer-term multivariate analysis of the trends or fluctuations in female LFPR would be required, something which is beyond the scope of this paper. The aim of this paper is to highlight the findings of a simple descriptive bivariate analysis. These findings provide us with some insights regarding the present discussion of the trends in the female LFPR. The findings should not be regarded as conclusive, but rather as indicative. Sources: NSS Employment and Unemployment Reports for 1993 Reports for /1994 Reports for , 1999 Reports for /2000 Reports for and 2004 Reports for /2005 2009 figures are based on the authors' own calculations. * Labor force participation refers to the 15-59 age group according to the usual principal and subsidiary status (UPSS). Only the quinquennial rounds are taken into account. Quinquennial rounds before 1993/1994 are not considered because of comparability problems (see Srinivasan 2010) .
2 A person can either be employed or working, unemployed or not working, or not working and not available for work. Only the latter person is then classified as not being part of the labor force. The reference period is a year, week, or day. For an in-depth explanation of the classification procedure see Srinivasan (2010) .
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Neff/Sen/Kling: The Puzzling Decline in Rural Women's Labor Force Participation in India Four potential explanations for the decline in rural women's LFPR can be found in the current Indian debate: Firstly, that women in rural areas are now pursuing higher education and are therefore simply not available for the labor force (Chowdhury 2011; Rangarajan et al. 2011 ). Secondly, that household incomes could have risen in rural areas due to higher wage levels, which would thus take the pressure off of women to seek employment in times of economic hardship (World Bank 2010; Himanshu 2011; Rangarajan et al. 2011) . Thirdly, that the decline in women's LFPR is due to an overall decline in or absence of short-and longterm employment opportunities in rural areas (World Bank 2010; Chowdhury 2011; Mazumdar and Neetha 2011) . Finally, that the decline in the rural female LFPR could be due to cultural factors and social constraints which might be coming to the fore due to rising incomes or limited employment opportunities (see Das 2006; Olsen and Mehta 2006; Chowdhury 2011) . The aim of this paper is to reexamine the explanations put forward in the literature through a systematic descriptive analysis of the 61 st and recent 66 th round NSS EUS data.
Each of the four explanations is discussed in turn.
The Education Effect: Rural Female Labor Force Participation and Education
Education has been proposed as one of the explanations for the decline in the rural female LFPR. It is assumed that more women in rural areas are now pursuing higher education and are therefore not available for work (see Himanshu 2011 , Rangarajan et al. 2011 ). Chowdhury (2011 , however, questions this explanation and puts forward the arguments that the overall employment situation for women has not improved and that rural female LFP has declined for all women above the age of 15, not just for those in the 15-24 age group. In fact, the rural female LFPR declined across all age groups between 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 (see Table 2 ).
The highest percentage point change of -15.9 can be found among the women aged 30-34. [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] in terms of population. Table 4 ). This seems to support the hypothesis that the decline in rural women's LFPR is due to an increase in the number of women pursuing higher education. However, a similar increase of 9 percentage points can be observed among the urban women in the same age group, without an accompanying strong decline in female LFPRs in urban areas. Moreover, even if the larger number of women pursuing higher education is responsible for the currently observed decline in the rural female LFPR, this does not mean that the LFPR of rural women will increase in the future because they are better educated. In India, there is a clear U-shaped relationship between educational level and LFPR. As Figure 1 illustrates, women who are illiterate have a higher probability of being in the labor force. With rising education level, the labor force participation of rural women declines; it only rises significantly again with a university degree. Hence, the assumption would be that with rising educational levels rural women are more likely not to be in the labor force and also have a higher likelihood of remaining outside the labor force. This trend might only be reversed for those with a university degree. Taken together, these findings appear to only partly support the hypothesis that rural female labor force participation has declined because of the rising numbers of rural women pursuing higher education. Even though rural female LFP is declining across all age groups, as
Chowdhury (2011) Rangarajan et al. (2011: 70) propose that this could be because agriculture has become drought resilient, because the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) 3 has managed to provide supplementary jobs, 3 The MGNREGS guarantees a hundred days of paid manual work for each rural household. The average daily wage paid through the scheme is in most cases higher than the average daily wages paid in the respective regions.
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Neff/Sen/Kling: The Puzzling Decline in Rural Women's Labor Force Participation in India or because wages have gone up. The income effect can thus also work the other way: with higher incomes, which help households escape poverty, there could be a tendency for women to withdraw from the labor force to attend to domestic duties (Rangarajan et al. 2011 ). This could be a pure income effect, where women opt out of the labor force, but it could also be the result of social norms coming to the fore again with rising incomes, and women thus being pushed out of the labor force (see Section 5). In the following discussion we first explore the potential relationship between income and rural female LFP and secondly try to analyze the extent to which an income effect could explain the decline in rural female LFPR.
Figure 2 displays the probability of labor force participation among rural women by the mean household wages of male household members. 4 It clearly shows that with higher mean male household wage levels, the probability that the female/s in the household will be part of the labor force diminishes. 5
Figure 2: Probability of Rural Remale LFP by Mean Male Household Wages, 2009/2010
Source: NSS 66 th round. Authors' own calculations.
4 Note: Figure 3 contains information only about households where wage data for males were available. Females who live in households without a male member or without wage data for a male member -for example, households which exclusively pursue self-employed activities -are not part of this figure.
5 In the logit estimate the coefficient of log male wage is -0.441 and it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Neff/Sen/Kling: The Puzzling Decline in Rural Women's Labor Force Participation in India
11
A U-shaped probability curve between rural women's paid LFP and log household consumption expenditure can be seen in Figure 3 . 6 The probability that women will pursue paid work is higher for households with lower per capita household consumption expenditure, then declines at mid-range per capita household consumption levels and rises again for households with high per capita household consumption levels. This supports the hypothesis of distress employment -that is, that women are forced to work in times of economic distress in the household. Once the household has reached and can sustain a certain level of consumption, rural women are not forced to work. However, after a certain threshold the probability that rural women will pursue work increases again with rising per capita household expenditure. Another indicator of the existence of an income effect can be seen in Drèze and Srinivasan (1997) , for example, show that single widows living with unmarried children and female household heads were more likely to live in poverty when compared to the society as a whole, in all of India. Widows or divorcees might, however, face fewer cultural or social barriers that prevent them from working outside the home and are sometimes more free to migrate seasonally since there is no husband or family to prevent them from doing so. The mean wage levels of the male household members across all wage quintile groups did increase (see Table 6 ). The largest increase can be observed for the two lowest quintile What is more, there is evidence that wage levels for women rose over this period. The wages of female casual workers increased by 117 percent whereas those of men increased by 101 percent (see Table 7 ). This unequal rise slightly narrowed the gender wage gap for casual workers. Table 8 ). In 2009/2010 this rate had dropped by 8.2 percentage points to 39.1 percent. At the same time, the relative share of casual workers increased by 7.3 percentage points; hence, one could argue that the share of unpaid family workers had mainly moved towards casual work. In total, 61.8 percent of the working women were remunerated. Nevertheless, due to the total rural female LFP decline, in 2009/2010 only 24 percent of all working-age rural women had a rem.
As highlighted in this section, the descriptive and bivariate analysis seems to support the hypothesis regarding the existence of an income effect that could explain the decline in the rural female LFPR. Firstly, we find that the probability of rural women's LFP drops the higher the men's wages are. Secondly, the probability that rural females will participate in the labor force initially declines with higher household expenditure and then rises again in a U-shaped way. Thirdly, widows, divorcees and women living alone are significantly more likely to be in the labor force. Moreover, we find that the mean male wage levels in the two lowest wage quintiles saw the largest increase between 2004 and 2010, and that the decline in the rural female LFPR was highest for these two wage quintile groups. The mean wages of male and female casual workers appear to have risen, whereas the gender wage gap has only slightly decreased, implying that the opportunity costs for rural women have not decreased much. To summarize, although they rely on a simple analysis, our findings can be seen to support the assumption that the income effect provides a plausible explanation for the decline in the rural women's LFPR since 2004. This income effect could, however, be mediated by other factors, such as labor market opportunities.
Labor Demand: Rural Female Labor Force Participation and Employment Opportunities
Labor market outcomes for rural women differ significantly across India's states. The lowest LFP among rural women can be found in Bihar (see Figure 4) , where only about 11 percent of rural women participate in the labor force. This state is followed, surprisingly, by Goa given that the working-age population is estimated to increase by 12 million people a year over the next decade, of whom between 8 to 9 million persons will be looking for jobs (WB 2010). Table 9 ). Bihar, which has the lowest level of rural female LFP (rank 1), also has the lowest per capita NSDP. The per capita NSDP rankings for most states seem to be largely consistent with the rural female LFP ranking. 9 Noteworthy negative outliers are Goa, Punjab, Kerala, and Haryana, which have rather low rural female LFP despite high rates of per capita NSDP. This seems to imply a lack of employment opportunities for rural women in these Table 10 ). Four findings stand out:
1) All states have experienced substantial annual growth rates of between 4 and 17 percentage points; hence, one would assume that employment opportunities have increased.
2) The rural female LFPR has, however, declined in the majority of the states -with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura, where an increase in rural women's LFP of 1.5 and 15 percentage points, respectively, can be observed.
3 The structure of the rural economy is thus characterized by an oversupply of labor (HarrissWhite 2003). As a result of stronger competition with men due to the increasing population, women might have even fewer employment opportunities and might be forced out of or drop out of the labor force altogether. Moreover, supply-side factors such as social customs that disadvantage certain social groups (for instance, women or lower-caste groups) in the labor market might also be at work. For example, tasks are traditionally assigned along gender lines. This is referred to as the sexual division of labor. In agriculture women undertake most tasks except for plowing, which has traditionally remained a male domain. If a task is performed by women, then it is perceived as less valuable (Banerjee 1995) , which in turn negatively affects the wage. Women are paid much lower wages than men and are often forced to work as unpaid family workers. Mazumdar and Neetha (2011) argue that the period of deindustrialization between 1999 and 2005 led to a decline in nonagricultural employment opportunities for women.
In 2009/2010 the rural economy was still dominated by low-productivity agriculture. The vast majority of both rural working men (61 percent) and rural working women (80 percent) work in the agricultural sector, which accounts for 67 percent of the total rural workforce (see Table 11 ). Other industries with a significant share of women include manufacturing (6.1 percent), construction (5.6 percent), and other services (4.9 percent). Apart from agriculture, rural men work in construction (12 percent), retail, hotels and restaurants (8.3 percent), manufacturing (7.3 percent), and other services (5.9 percent). The gender difference in workforce presence by industry is significant at the 1 percent level. 13 Could changes in the output of a specific industrial sector with a substantial number of women workers be responsible for the decline in rural women's LFPR? All industrial sectors experienced GDP growth between 2004 and 2010; some, however, suffered a relative loss in terms of their share in total GDP (see Table 12 ). Although the agricultural sector has experi- support the hypothesis that a decrease in the output of a specific sector with a substantial share of women workers is accountable for the decline in the rural female LFPR. across all household types. This could imply that the decrease in the rural female LFPR cannot be explained by a decline in agricultural employment opportunities or by a decline in nonagricultural employment opportunities. In this section we have explored the potential differences in labor market opportunities for rural women. We have found that there were large differences in rural female LFP rates at Are there social and cultural constraints in existence which prevent women from entering the labor force? As was established in Section 3, there are large differences in rural women's LFP according to region. This implies not only structural but also cultural differences (see Table 10 above). 14 An indicator of unfavorable gender roles is the prevailing gender ratio in the respective states. It could be argued that a low gender ratio -that is, a lower ratio of females to males -is an indication of prevailing social and cultural norms that discriminate against women. Many of those states (for example, Meghalaya, Chhattisgarh, Mizoram, Andhra Pradesh, Himanchal Pradesh) with rather neutral or natural gender ratios also seem to be the states with higher rural female LFP. Some of the states (Bihar, Punjab) with gender ratios strongly skewed towards male children also have lower levels of rural female LFP. However, the relationship is not that clear. Outliers include Kerala, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Maharashtra. A better picture can perhaps be derived by comparing regions. If we assume that regions within India are culturally distinct, a comparison of regions could serve as an indicator of the effect of culture on rural female LFP. 15 The lowest rural female LFPR can be found in the East, where approximately 79 percent of women are not part of the labor force, followed by the Northeast, with approximately 70 percent of women absent from the labor force, and the North, with a total of nearly 60 percent (see Table 14 ). In contrast, the rural female LFPRs in the West (52 percent) and South (55 percent) are much higher, with over 23 50 percent of rural women in the labor force. There are pronounced differences between the cultural regions in terms of labor market outcomes for rural women. 16 The main reason that women give for why they are not part of the labor force (according to their activity status) is that they are doing domestic work (85 percent), which is a sign of patriarchal gender roles and norms. Only 13 percent report that they are receiving an education, sional full-or part-time work (7 percent). More than half of these women also report, however, that they do not have the necessary skills to undertake the work they would accept (52 percent).
That women are confined to their reproductive roles seems to be a conclusion that one can derive from Table 15 . Rural women with at least one child below the age of five have a significantly (at the 5 percent level) lower LFPR. 18 When the male household wage levels are taken into account, however, the picture changes (see Table 16 ). It seems that it is not the presence of a child below the age of five that explains rural women's LFP but rather the actual wage levels of the male household members. 19 16 The relationship between region and rural female LFP is significant at the 1 percent level (chi2 (4) = 29000). 18 Chi2 (1) = 129.1; P = 0.0349.
19 Chi2 (9) = 10300; P = 0.0000.
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Neff/Sen/Kling: The Puzzling Decline in Rural Women's Labor Force Participation in India A similar income effect can be observed across social groups (see Table 17 ), since social groups correspond very significantly with income groups. Across all wage quintiles, rural Scheduled Tribes (ST) women have the highest LFPR of all social groups, followed by Other Backward Castes (OBCs) (except for the fourth quintile), Scheduled Castes (SCs) and others.
Nevertheless, the LFPR decreases across all social groups the higher the household's male wage level is. The results are significant at the 1 percent level 20 .
Cultural constraints can be observed across religious groups (see Table 18 ). Of the two largest religious groups, Hindus have a significantly higher rural female LFPR than Muslims. 21 This holds true across all wage quintile groups. The Muslim rural female LFPR remains rather low across all wage quintiles except for the lowest wage quintile, where a larger proportion of Muslim women are part of the labor force than all other quintile groups. In the so-called "Sachar Report" the Government of India (2006) highlighted the fact that Muslim girls have a very low school enrollment rate and a very low probability of working in a salaried job. The Muslim religious group is also believed to have the highest average reproduc-20 Chi2 (19)= 15400; P = 0.0000.
21 Chi2 (14)= 17300; P = 0.0000. 25 tion rate, which implies that Muslim women might be more likely to be reduced to their reproductive role than their Hindu counterparts. Nevertheless, a potential income effect seems to be more probable. The higher the household's male wage contribution, the lower the probability of rural female LFP, with or without the presence of children below the age of five. A similar picture emerges for the different social groups. The only social or cultural factor at work independently of income can be found across religious groups. Rural Muslim women have a significantly lower LFPR across all wage quintiles compared to their Hindu counterparts.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has tried to revisit the main explanations -namely, that there is possibly an education, income, employment opportunity, or social/cultural-interaction effect -put forward Our exploratory analysis has found some potential evidence of an education effect. Although rural female LFP declined across all age groups, the 15-24 age group had the largest relative impact because it constituted 29 percent of the total rural labor force (aged 15-59).
We have shown that the number of rural women pursuing higher education increased after 2004, which could explain the decline in the rural women's LFPR, but we also found this trend for urban women without an accompanying decline in the LFPR. Hence, it seems that education cannot be seen as the main reason behind the decline.
The effect of income, in contrast, appears to be stronger. Our analysis supports the existence of a general income effect since the probability of rural females' participation in the labor force falls with higher male household wage levels. The analysis also reveals a U-shaped relationship between rural women's LFP and household expenditure. Moreover, wages, particularly among the lower-income groups, appear to have increased; this appears to support the hypothesis that due to increasing household incomes, women are not forced to work in order to supplement the household income in times of distress. The income effect could, however, be mediated by changes in employment opportunities.
Our analysis of employment opportunities found significant differences in rural female LFP across states. Furthermore, we found a weak relationship between employment opportunities (proxied by NSDP) and rural women's LFP. Despite substantial economic growth in all states in the years 2004-2010, the rural female LFP declined in all states with the exception of Tripura and Jammu and Kashmir. Due to their share of the total rural women's labor force, the LFP decline in the larger states -especially in Uttar Pradesh -seems to have had the strongest impact on the overall decline in rural women's LFP. Could a change in the importance of a sector which employs a large share of women in its workforce be responsible for the decline? We found that 80 percent of rural working women were active in the agricultural sector. All of the sectors with larger shares of rural women grew after 2004 and increased in relative importance (measured by their share of total GDP) with the exception of the agriculture sector. In exploring rural female LFP by household type, we did not find that the share of women from households engaged in agricultural activities declined more than that of women from households not engaged in agricultural activities. This implies that a change in employment opportunities, whether in the agricultural sector or in the nonagricultural sector, cannot serve as an explanation for the decline in rural women's LFP.
Lastly, our analysis tried to explore whether there is evidence of social and cultural interaction effects. It is assumed that social and cultural factors could amplify possible income or employment opportunity effects. Although there is no doubt regarding the existence of social and cultural barriers to entering the labor force, we do not find support for any such amplifying effects. Our findings suggest that the decline in rural women 's LFP between 2004 's LFP between /2005 and 2009/2010 is mainly due to an income effect and partly due to an education effect. Neither changes in employment opportunities nor social and cultural interaction effects seem to play as big a role as the income effect and, to a lesser degree, the education effect in explaining the decline in rural female LFP.
As pointed out in the introduction, our simple bivariate analysis should only be seen as a first exploratory step in revisiting the four main explanations put forward regarding the puzzle of the declining rural female LFPR. More in-depth research is needed to better understand this puzzle, especially research with a focus on trends or fluctuations in the female LFPR over time. In addition to an in-depth analysis of the quinquennial NSS EUS rounds, focused primary surveys and more in-depth qualitative research are required to better address questions regarding the determinants of women's labor force participation in general, the constraints they face in the labor market, the type of work they do, and so on. It is especially important that the family and household contexts be incorporated in order that the influences on women's decisions and choices around work can be better understood.
